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| Toppling Saddam: The Japanese Connection |
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Friday, March 22nd, 2002
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Is Japan a mute bystander in the international discussion about what to do about Iraq? Probably not, writes Eamonn Fingleton.
On Tuesday (March 19, 2002), I addressed a lively meeting of senior officers at Camp Zama, the U.S. Army�s major base a few hours outside Tokyo. Entitled �Titanium Cherry Blossom,� my talk was an account of Japan's impressive strengths in military/industrial technology. Much of what I had to say will be familiar to anyone who glances occasionally at this website (or has read my books). But one aspect of the discussion might be worth recording here � my analysis of the geopolitical problems facing the Bush administration as it contemplates how to arrange a �leadership transition� in Iraq.
As I reminded the Camp Zama audience, the U.S. has long been heavily dependent on Japan for fundamental hardware technologies. In fact without key Japanese components and materials, American weapons systems simply would not work. This became notably clear during the Gulf War in 1991, when Japanese suppliers seemed excessively tardy in providing essential supplies for the move against Saddam Hussein.
So how will Japan react this time if, as the U.S. media have long been convinced, President George W. Bush presses ahead with a new war on Iraq?
In truth the Japanese establishment is even less enthusiastic for war this time than it was even in 1991. To be sure, Prime Minister Koizumi sounded quite supportive of the U.S. administration�s hawkish stance when President Bush visited Tokyo in February. But, for all his supposed popularity with the public, Koizumi is a marginal figure in the Japanese power system -- and is getting ever more marginal by the minute. Even if he found himself still in office when the Bush administration is finally ready to move (a big if), he would have little influence on the general anti-war consensus in the higher reaches of the Tokyo establishment.
So what, if anything, will the Tokyo establishment do to restrain Bush? I doubt if this time we will see anything so obvious as an effort to withhold essential supplies from the American military. Given the superpatriotic mood in the United States these days, such a strategy would risk triggering a massive political reaction in the United States � a reaction, moreover, that might stimulate serious efforts in Washington to rebuild the U.S. military-industrial base.
That said, Tokyo does not lack for options. As it has almost always done in previous geopolitical developments, it will want to keep as low a media profile as possible. But working behind the scenes, it can be counted on to press vigorously for peace. It can be expected in particular to lean on America�s European and Middle Eastern allies to stand up firmly to Bush. Tokyo�s message is not likely to be dismissed lightly. Why? Not to put too fine a point on it, while the Western media have been busy intoning the last rites for the Japanese economic system in recent years, the world�s political leaders know better. In fact in crucial respects such as foreign direct investment, Japan is far stronger today than it was even a decade ago. Thus any nation that wants to continue to receive the car factories, semiconductor fabs, and the other goodies of Japan's vast foreign direct investment program will listen politely to Tokyo�s advice. No doubt in many cases, Tokyo will be pushing on an open door. But its advice will certainly help stiffen the backbones of people like Britain�s Tony Blair and Germany�s Gebhard Schroeder in talking back to President Bush.
Other avenues are also open to Tokyo. There is, for instance, the fact that without Japanese money, Wall Street would more or less grind to a halt. Tokyo�s denials to the contrary, Japanese financial institutions are highly regulated in a way that gives top Japanese bureaucrats great control over the ultimate destination of the nation�s vast overseas portfolio investments. Of course, if Tokyo were to yank Wall Street�s chain, it would be most unlikely to acknowledge this publicly. What we are talking about here is a modest touch on the financial brakes. U.S. bonds might drop 5 percent and the Dow by 10 or 15 percent. The dollar would also weaken enough to get the Bushies� attention. Almost before these moves began, Wall Street analysts could be counted on to trumpet the message that the administration�s hawkishness was undermining investor confidence in the American economy.
President Bush may require more intestinal fortitude than he currently realizes, if he is to succeed in toppling Saddam.
Eamonn Fingleton is the author most recently of In Praise of Hard Industries: Why Manufacturing, Not the Information Economy, Is the Key to Future Prosperity (Houghton Mifflin, 1999).
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